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The paper discusses the meta-philosophy of thought-experiments, 
in particular its neglected diachronic aspect, focusing on Putnam’s 
work as the paradigm case, and on the trail(s) that developed out 
of the Twin Earth thought-experiment. Putnam's experiment is 
discussed from a perspective that combines metaphilosophy and 
actual history of analytic philosophy. Peter Unger has branded the 
whole debate around it as empty and fruitless. A meta-
philosophical analysis shows him to be wrong. The experiment as 
originally proposed already appeals to a broad variation of 
examples and intuitive induction; the variation continues in other 
works addressing the issue, and produces interesting results. The 
second aspect is the search for reflective equilibrium, lasting till 
the present day. The internal logic of these processes is discussed, 
in order to show that the accusation for emptiness turns against 
Unger himself. In general, debates around thought-experiments, 
the already famous and also around new ones, make a large part of 
contemporary analytic philosophy. The way to understand a large 
part of this, and of debates surrounding it, is to link it to the 
internal understanding of a typical thought-experiment; stages of a 
particular experiment get discussed, developed and changed in the 
history of a particular trail produced by it. This is an important 
way in which a philosophical tradition is born, and we need to 
combine synchronic and diachronic approaches in order to 
understand it. !
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1. Introduction !
Putnam is one of the most successful thought-experimenters in twentieth-
century philosophy; he has produced two great thought experiments, 
Twin Earth one and the Brain-in-a-vat one, and many related smaller 
ones.The two great ones have marked analytic philosophy of our time, 
from philosophy of language through philosophy of mind to philosophy 
of science and general metaphysics. Here we shall look at his Twin Earth 
thought experiment (Twin Earth TE for short), anticipated by Putnam in 
his 1970 paper „Is semantics possible?“ and formulated in 1975 in „The 
Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, and at a recent criticism of it, due to Peter Unger 
(2014). We shall briefly defend Putnam from the criticism, and 
concentrate on Unger’s complaint about endless “spates of papers” 
generated by TEs in recent analytic philosophy. We shall argue that the 
prolonged discussions of fundamental thought experiments (TEs) TEs in 
various (sub-) disciplines of philosophy define big chunks of the history 
of analytic philosophy (not to mention three centuries of debates over 
Social contract TEs and Evil Demon TE). The meta-philosophy and 
epistemology of TEs has to take this phenomenon into account, thus 
connecting history of philosophy with meta-philosophical theorizing. We 
shall argue for this suggestion in connection with Twin Earth TE, and the 
ensuing debate. 
Let me just mention that recently the publication of such discussions of 
TE is becoming systematic. Andrew Pessin and Sanford Goldberg have 
collected important papers on Twin Earth TE in their The Twin earth 
chronicles from 1996 (see References). Two years ago Cambridge 
University Press has started a series, Classic Philosophical Arguments, 
pretty much concentrated on TEs, like The Brain in a vat (Goldberg 
2016), The Prisoner’s dilemma (Peterson 2015) and The Original 
position (Hinton 2015). The meta-philosophy (or epistemology) of TEs 
has to join on the theoretical side, connecting history of philosophy with 
meta-philosophical theorizing. 
Here is then the preview. Section II focuses on Twin Earth thought 
experiment, starting with a short reminder, and continuing with a brief 
proposal of how to distinguish stages in thought-experimenting, in 
particular within the Twin Earth example(s). Section III asses to Unger’s 
criticism (from his Empty Ideas, (Unger 2014)) and then turns to the 
defense of Twin Earth TE. Section IV continues the discussion with 
Unger by turning to the trails-traditions that have sprung out Twin Earth 
TE, and connecting the trails to various aspects of the experiment itself. 
Thus the short-term and long-term patterns of Putnam’s thought-
experimental reasoning and its continuation are brought together. Section 
VI attempts to generalize the morals of the defense beyond Twin Earth 
cases, first mentioning Putnam’s other famous TE, the Brain-in-the-Vat, 
and then moving very briefly to other examples central in the history of  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philosophy. It then summarizes our answer to one of the central questions 
of the paper: why go historical in the meta-philosophy of TEs, rather than 
stay with the usual style of topical discussion? !
2. Reminder: The Twin Earth TE and its stages !
Let me start with a general characterization of thought experiments. So, 
what is a TE? It is an investigative procedure „in the armchair“, which 
normally involves 
0. the formulation of experimental design pointing to 
i) the determination of the goal(s),in particular the thesis/
theory to be tested, and  
ii) the construction of a (typically) counterfactual scenario to 
be considered 
1. the presentation of the scenario thus constructed to the 
experimental subject (either the author of the scenario herself, or 
an interlocutor),  1
2. understanding done by the experimental subject  
3. the (typically imaginative) contemplation of the scenario and 
some piece of reasoning, 
4. the decision („intuition“) concerning the thesis/theory to be 
tested, and then the variations and generalizations from the result. 
Once this result is achieved, it can be, and often is compared with results 
of other thought experiments in the vicinity. We shall see that the 
characterization captures the TE we are interested in. 
In his “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” Putnam famously introduced his 
Twin Earth TE as a „science-fiction example” (!): 
For the purpose of the following science-fiction examples, we shall 
suppose that somewhere in the galaxy there is a planet we shall call 
‘Twin Earth’. Twin Earth is much like Earth; in fact, people on 
Twin Earth even speak English. In fact, apart from the differences 
we shall specify in our science-fiction examples, the reader may 
suppose that Twin Earth is exactly like Earth. 
Twin Earth is very much like Earth; in fact, people on Twin Earth 
even speak English. In fact, apart from the differences we shall 
specify in our science-fiction examples, the reader may suppose 
that Twin Earth is exactly like Earth.  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He may even suppose that he has a Doppelgänger - an identical 
copy – on Twin Earth, if he wishes, although my stories will not 
depend on this. (Putnam 1975, 223) 
The next move can be described as separating chemical composition of 
the liquid known as “water” from its stereotype. 
I shall suppose that the oceans and lakes and seas of Twin Earth 
contain XYZ and not water, that it rains XYZ on Twin Earth and 
not water, etc. (Ibid.) 
Let me note that I have asked Putnam in conversation whether we can use 
Kant’s idea of “separating” in “experiments with our mind” of elements 
that normally go together to characterize what he is doing in Twin Earth 
scenario, and he very emphatically agreed. 
Next comes the question for the reader: when a Twin Earthling uses the 
word “water” does he refer to water? So, after the stage of presentation 
and question raising, we presumably have reader’s understanding. The 
reader is expected to imagine the situation, to build a model, so to speak. 
The next comes the reader’s intuitive answer. The expected answer is 
negative: the Twin Earthling refers to what is in fact XYZ, and it is not 
water! 
Let me mention some obvious problems with the performance of the TE 
at these early stages. First, consider the construction of a (typically) 
counterfactual scenario to be considered, and its presentation at the stage 
one. The proponent, say Putnam, is testing people’s intuitions, and 
hopefully, the non-specialists will be included, since he wants ordinary 
intuitions from non-experts (as well as from his colleagues, the experts). 
So, the story has to be relatively short and not too technical; the best 
would be if it were not technical at all. This is the first sore point: any 
expert will be able to come with some counterexample to the short story. 
Note the parallel with “real” experiments: typically a single experiment 
concerns just one variable, and taken in isolation proves very little. What 
is being done is rich controlled variation; real laboratory is in this respect 
very similar to the laboratory of the mind. 
One feature of experiments closely connected to learning is their 
variability: scientists perform them over and over again with 
modifications which may be systematic and intentional or intuitive 
and exploratory. Variation is one of the key factors in the success 
of experiment. Frequency of variation in Faraday's experiments is 
apparent from his laboratory notebooks: these records suggest a lot 
of unrecorded and unpremeditated variation. (James 1989, 67) 
The construction and the presentation culminate with a question. We 
might assume that the main question in the original version of the TE 
concerns reference: does the word “water” in the Twin Earth language 
refer to water or not?  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Next, the understanding. It is happening within the conversation, or at 
least the reading. Strong pragmatic considerations might intervene. First, 
the motivational ones. The recipient might wonder why she is being 
asked a particular question, what are the expectations, and so on. Next 
comes the understanding of the content received; no non-technical, 
ordinary piece of discourse is free of potential ambiguity, and we know 
these days that ambiguities often do show their teeth. 
Unfortunately, philosophers sometimes suggest more than is needed for 
mere understanding. Putnam does it. And here is the simple illustration, 
in the passage we just quoted. “I shall suppose that the oceans and lakes 
and seas of Twin Earth contain XYZ and not water…”, he writes at the 
very beginning of his presentation of Twin Earth. But does this not 
assume that XYZ is not water? Does this not dictate the intuition that the 
reader is suppose to contribute himself? What if the reader has the 
opposite feeling: if it looks like water, tastes like water, and so on, than it 
is water; I don’t care for chemistry! Too bad, the TE was supposed to test 
intuitions, not to suggest them! 
I shall assume that the recipient next builds her model of the situation; let 
it be the stage Three of the initial TE. This stage is not controllable by the 
proponent any more, and the model-building depends a lot on specific 
skills, memories and interest of the recipient. But Putnam does suggest 
the answer, although he should not be doing this. Let me assume that the 
recipient goes through some unconscious reasoning; we shall not need it 
here. So much about the problems. 
The stage Four is then the rise of intuition concerning the thesis/theory to 
be tested.: “It seems to me, very obviously, that the Twin Earthling does 
not refer to water”. 
Normally, the recipient is expected to generalize: is what is valid for 
water also valid for gold, silver, and so on? The process has been called 
‘intuitive induction’ by Roderick Chisholm (1977, Theory of Knowledge, 
ch. 4, section ‘ Intuitive induction’), who borrowed the term from W.D. 
Ross. Anyway, the intuitive induction ends with a general judgment; in 
this case “what is valid for water should be valid for gold, silver, and so 
on.” I would add some obvious and immediate consequences, for 
instance: it is the deep structure of the matter that ultimately determines 
reference for typical mass terms. 
Again, this stage, our number Five, is rife with problems. Assume that the 
intuition is valid for gold; what about “wine” or “brandy”? Is it really the 
chemical composition that counts, rather than drinkability, taste and the 
effects on the consumer? 
What normally follows is theorizing. The new generalization (and its 
immediate consequences) should confront the rest of our theoretical 
commitments, in this case ranging from the ones in chemistry to the ones 
in semantics. And it should explain the intuitions discovered in the course  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of TEs. Let me borrow the famous term from Rawls, “reflective 
equilibrium” and call this, sixth stage, the search for reflective 
equilibrium. Putnam did find one, and a quite radical one, for that matter, 
namely a restructuring of the whole of semantics. This is the final stage, 
number seven, the reflective equilibrium itself. We shall return to it later. 
So much about the first (version of) Twin Earth TE. We noted the 
existence of challenging points at each stage. If you are pessimistic, you 
can call them “sensitive points” of a TE, if you are optimistic, you can 
describe them as “productive points”, since they obviously invite 
questions and discussion. 
Why “productive”? Consider how the experimenting proceeds further, in 
Putnam’s text. After coming to the conclusion, one might ask a slightly 
different question, introducing history. Perhaps our intuitions concerning 
water are really dictated by Lavoisier’s discovery of its chemical 
composition. We need to introduce a more dramatic variation. 
So, we arrive at Version Two: this time by introducing history of 
chemistry. Stages One and Two are re-done: Imagine Oscar1 and Oscar2 
living in 1750. Did each understand the term 'water' differently from the 
other? Again, the intuition seems to suggest that they did: the first 
referred to what is in fact H2O, the second to what is in fact XYZ. So, 
Oscar1 and Oscar2 understood the term 'water' differently in 1750 
although they were in the same psychological state, and although, given 
the state of science at the time, it would have taken their scientific 
communities about fifty years to discover that they understood the term 
'water' differently. We perform some intuitive induction and end up with 
the general judgment, valid also for gold, and the like. 
But what about the kinds of stuff that are both present around, 
perceptually indistinguishable, and strongly associated with some 
familiar product; or at least one of them is. This suggests further 
variation. 
Version Three: “we will now suppose that molybdenum is as common on 
Twin Earth as aluminum is on Earth, and that aluminum is as rare on 
Twin Earth as molybdenum is on Earth. In particular, we shall assume 
that ' aluminum' pots and pans are made of molybdenum on Twin Earth. 
Finally, we shall assume that the words 'aluminum' and ‘molybdenum' are 
switched on Twin Earth: ' aluminum' is the name of molybdenum and ' 
molybdenum' is the name of aluminum.”. (Putnam 1975, 225) 
Version Four: the final question concerns non-exotic, not rare specimens, 
and moves from science fiction to ordinary examples and from mass 
terms to kind-terms in botanics and the like; this is the elm-beech 
example (Putnam 1975, 226). 
We arrive now to the general conclusion: meanings can vary with 
psychological states remaining constant explanation: meaning depends on  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external causal connections. 
We claim that it is possible for two speakers to be in exactly the 
same psychological state (in the narrow sense), even though the 
extension of the term A in the idiolect of the one is different from 
the extension of the term A in the idiolect of the other. (Putnam 
1975, 222) 
How is this possible? We need explanation, and it will appeal to causal 
theory and division of linguistic labor. Further steps lead to the final 
reflective equilibrium, strongly revisionary of traditional Fregean 
semantics (for a historical overview see Floyd 2005, in References). Here 
are then the stages. 
STAGES EVENTS
Stage 0 - design
Stage 1 - the question The scenario presented and the question: To 
what does the Twin Earth speaker refer with 
her word “water”?
Stage 2 - understanding The reader understand the scenario and the 
question.
Stage 3 - tentative conscious 
production: tries to imagine the 
arrangement and does it to one’s 
satisfaction.
!
Imagining the other planet.
Stage 3a - possible non-conscious 
elaboration
Possible problems: what is my body made of 
there? 
Is such a scenario possible at all?
Stage 4 - Intuition: immediate 
spontaneous answer
The Twin Earth speaker refers to XYZ, not to 
water.
Stage 5 - Intuitive induction: 
varying and generalizing
Variations: First, other materials. 
Next: History of chemistry, 
Aluminum-molybdenum, 
Elm-beech
Stage 6 - general belief Extensions can differ, although the speakers are 
in the same psychological state.
Stage 6a - explanation “Meanings are not in the head”, causal theory, 
division of linguistic labor
Stage 7 - search for  
reflective equilibrium
Discussion of description theory in  
semantics, criticism of it 
Stage 7a - reflective  
equilibrium achieved




This concludes the short reminder of the original TE(s). Very soon after 
the original presentation, several philosophers, and Tyler Burge in 
particular in 1979 paper “Individualism and the mental”, famously noted 
that the story about linguistic meaning can be extended to mental content 
as well. Burge developed it into an externalist theory of mental content. 
Again, we have a variation, but rather dramatic one, primarily at the level 
of immediate conclusions from Twin Earth and similar TEs, and perhaps 
even deeper, at the level of initial question. The reader is presented with 
variations Oscar1 and Oscar2 scenario, and now, in the ‘laboratory of her 
mind she has to test a bit different assumption: is the content of Oscar1’s 
mental state when thinking of the relevant metal the same as Oscar2’s or 
not? Burge famously answered in the negative. Here is Putnam’s 
comment on Burge from 1996: “…I have come to believe that he is right” 
and “…I agree with his paper” (Goldberg 1996, xxi). 
Once the new question was around, a new round of reactions followed, 
represented by ten famous paper reproduced in (Goldberg 1996) mostly 
from the eighties, when the action was at its peak. Searle (1983) insisted 
that the difference between contents is internal, due to the nature of 
intentionality, and reflexive functioning of the indexical(s) allegedly 
involved (“this metal”). Fodor (1991) proposed two kinds of content, and 
argued for the primacy of the internal, “narrow“, one. Dennett came up 
with the idea of a “notional content” (see his contribution in Goldberg 
1996) and Jackson (in Goldberg 1996) proposed a stable, compromise 
solution, that later developed into “two-dimensionalism”. The difference 
in the question asked, or at least the difference in the weight assigned to 
the mental in contrast to the linguistic, resulted in differences in 
intuitions, then in generalizations arrived at, and then projected deep into 
the area of explanation and reflective equilibrium (see Goldberg 1996) 
for a nice collection of historically crucial papers). So, hopefully, the 
attention to stages might help us understand the further history of the 
Twin Earth TE. 
But why care about such matters? Why go historical in the meta-
philosophy of TEs, rather than stay with the usual style of topical 
discussion? We shall say more about the process after we take a look at 
the recent criticism of Putnam and of methodology of analytic philosophy 
in general.  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3. Empty thoughts: Peter Unger’s critism of Putnam and analytic 
methodology !
Let me start by quoting Peter Unger’s interview in which he nicely 
summarizes his view of contemporary philosophy: 
Philosophers easily get the idea that somehow or other, just by 
considering things about the world that they already know, they 
can write up deep stories which are true, or pretty nearly true, 
about how it is with the world. By that I especially mean the world 
of things that includes themselves, and everything that’s spatio-
temporally related to them, or anything that has a causal effect on 
anything else, and so on. They think they can tell a deep story 
about how it is that all of this stuff really hangs together, that’s 
much deeper, more enlightening and more comprehensive than 
anything that any scientist can do. 
And so philosophers proceed to write up these stories, and they’re 
under the impression that they’re saying something new and 
interesting about how it is about the world, when in fact this is all 
an illusion. To say new and interesting things about the world — 
and that’s very hard, things of any generality I mean, or even 
anything interesting — you really have to engage with a lot of 
science. And very few philosophers do any of that, at least in any 
relevant way. (Boey and Unger 2014) 
All this, Unger thinks, applies to Putnam, to whom several sections, and 
the whole chapter three of his book Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytic 
Philosophy, titled Earth, Twin Earth and History, are dedicated. 
His first criticism is simple: there is too much material, just spates of 
articles. He said he entered “twin earth”, coming up with 1,941 items, 
comprising 1,571 articles and 261 reviews, and the remainder in other 
categories. Is it good or bad? Depends on the quality of the articles. And 
here comes his second criticism: “...a fair lot of much of this remarkably 
empty literature” (Ibid.) 
And Unger comes, surprisingly, with an alternative proposal, a new Twin 
Earth thought experiment. Here is just the barest sketch. He invites us to 
imagine someone like Lavoisier, „on the verge of discovering that earthly 
water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen.” At the same time, the twin 
Lavoisier is on the verge of discovering the chemical composition of twin 
water. „In all their real mental powers, our two Joseph Antoines will be 
precisely similar, however we sensibly construe “mental powers”. not 
only as regards what behavior each is apt to produce (in any encountered 
environment) but also as concerns what experiencing each is apt to enjoy, 
each of our two chemists is, at our start, precisely similar to the 
other.” (2014: 64). “…/N/ow, suppose each ... of them „ to switch places 
with the other, almost instantaneously. with this switch, twinchemist will  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be here on earth, in 1750”. Of course, each proceeds with his discovery, 
only that it is now the twinchemist who discovers the composition of 
water. So, what is the big deal, Unger asks. “The capacity to „think of 
water” seems not to be needed for the job.” Having beliefs about water 
appears irrelevant to being able to discover water’s composition. Our 
belief-states have full general propensities, they react in the same way to 
water and twin water, Unger claims. Therefore, Putnam’s line is 
irrelevant!!! Unger than offers a very complicated and sophisticated TE 
with elementary particles, to introduce what he sees as the relevant 
alternative scenario. We shall not reproduce it here. 
Let us now pass to a brief defense of Twin Earth. First, Unger’s own 
methodology suggests the indispensability of TEs: even if you see 
analytic philosophy as a bunch of empty ideas, you will have to propose 
TEs of your own. This is a deep inconsistency in what Unger is doing. 
Alternatively, if he had looked at alternatives outside of analytic 
philosophy and had turned to recent continental authors, he would, with 
his criteria of clarity, probably see it as passing from contradiction to 
contradiction; not a very attractive option.  2
Unger sees the biggest part of analytic philosophy as being empty of 
concrete content. and proposes an alternative relying on extremely 
sophisticated scientific knowledge as the background for analytic 
philosopher. Emptiness is for him tied to the endless production of tons of 
empty material. So, let me briefly address his objection, and then 
concentrate upon the first one.  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Heidegger suggests that philosophy should become poetic. Here is a typical quote on 
human condition:  
But what is it that touches us directly out of the widest orbit? What is it that 
remains blocked off , withdrawn from us by ourselves in our ordinary willing to 
objectify the world? It is the other draft: Death. Death is what touches mortals in 
their nature, and so sets them on their way to the other side of life, and so into the 
whole of the pure draft. Death thus gathers into the whole of what is already 
posited, into the positum of the whole draft. As this gathering of positing, death is 
the laying-down, the Law, just as the mountain chain is the gathering of the 
mountains into the whole of its cabin. (Heidegger 1971, 123). 
Somebody like Unger, who finds Putnam not rigorous enough, would be probably 
shocked by the very idea that this claim of Heidegger is a piece of philosophy. Similarly 
with Derrida. Here is how Derrida expresses his view that a non-figurative treatment of 
metaphor is impossible: 
I am obliged to speak of [metaphor] more metaphorico, to it in its own manner. I 
cannot treat it (entraiter) without dealing with it (sans traiter avec elle) ... I do not 
succeed in producing a treatise (une traite) on metaphor which is not treated with 
(traite avec) metaphor which suddenly appears intractable (intraitable). (Derrida 
1998, 102–3). 
For more examples and a systematic discussion see my https://www.academia.edu/
1828410/PHILOSOPHIZING_WITHOUT_ARGUMENT
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The sources of potential philosophical knowledge are not mysterious as 
Unger sees them. Remember: “Philosophers easily get the idea that 
somehow or other, just by considering things about the world that they 
already know, they can write up deep stories which are true, or pretty 
nearly true, about how it is with the world.” This simply doesn’t fit the 
Twin Earth TE. The semantic part is about us. We might be unaware of 
the structure of our semantic habits – the reflection on cases can make us 
aware of it. As far as the non-human world is concerned, the info in the 
theory of Twin Earth TE comes from science, chemistry etc. and is then 
brought together with our understanding of meanings. 
This is, it seems to me, quite a general pattern with famous TEs in 
descriptive-explanatory theoretical philosophy. For instance, Jackson’s 
Black and White Mary makes sense only on the background of quite 
developed neurological picture of human mind, and questions one central 
ambition of it. The same with Putnam’s Brain-in-a-vat TE. One element 
that made it interesting was his replacing of the Cartesian thinker, ego, or 
whatever, with brain, and his connecting this to the up-to-date debates 
concerning Turing machines and Skolem-Lowenheim theorem (in chapter 
one of Reason, Truth and History; see the paper by Danilo Šuster in this 
volume). I think Tim Williamson is right about the abuse of the epithet 
“empty” by Unger: 
Unger’s use of the term “empty” is just an advertising trick. It’s 
like a competitor who defines “empty” as “containing nothing but 
brand X fruit juice” and then puts up posters warning that cartons 
of brand X fruit juice are empty. To read Empty Ideas, one must 
get through the equivalent of numerous elaborate descriptions of 
cartons of brand X fruit juice of various types, each concluding 
that the carton was empty, and for contrast some elaborate 
descriptions of cartons of brand Y fruit juice of various other types, 
each concluding that the carton was full. The reader’s task is made 
no easier by Unger’s loquacious, attention-seeking prose. 
(Williamson 2015, 22-23). 
We should then turn to meta-philosophy and history of philosophy. What 
about Unger’s first criticism? Does the spate of articles make any sense? 
Obviously it does for Unger, for he tries to add to it another version of 
Twin Earth TE. At the same time, it goes on his nerves. Here is a therapy: 
let us try to understand where the spates are coming from.  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4. Stages and traditions - from the synchronic to the diachronic !
Unger is obviously right about TEs generating spates of articles, full of 
comments, criticisms and alternative proposals. Where do these spates 
come from? How does a spate begin? In order to answer the questions we 
have to dig deeper into the matter, and ultimately, we need some meta-
philosophy explaining the recent history of analytic philosophy. First, we 
can note that spates come in trails. Unger himself notes the following: 
„Just a few years later and largely thanks to their contemplating 
Putnam’s Twin Earth scenarios, several other philosophers did 
endorse this further idea, concerning who thinks what, the two 
most t imely being, perhaps, Tyler Burge and Colin 
McGinn” (Unger 2014 ,77- 60). 
But the spate of articles that come out of Putnam’s and Burge’s efforts 
constitutes a trail, the externalist one. We can even call it a tradition. 
There is the contrary trail-tradition, represented by more internalistically 
oriented authors, from Searle to Jackson. 
The first thing to note is that the trails start as reactions to particular 
features of the original Twin Earth TE, and the second, and a surprising 
one, that reactions target particular stages of the TE, particular sore-
fruitful spots which one can use as starting points from one’s own 
proposals. Some authors, perhaps most famously Burge, widen the range 
of examples (from water to arthritis, and from true beliefs to 
systematically false ones), thus targeting the initial design of the TE and 
changing a bit the question asked, others stay with original example, but, 
at the stage of intuition-generation suggest a different intuition: some 
content of Twin Earthling’s thought is identical to the content of 
Earthling’s thought. The new intuition demands new explanation, and 
commands a different process of intuitive induction. 
In other words, there is a connection between the synchronic structure of 
stages and the diachronic process of generation of trails, even traditions. 
Let us take a closer look at the externalist and internalist trails. 
Start with Tyler Burge. Here is his question, stage 1: Does the ignorant 
person who believes that he has arthritis in his thighs refer to arthritis? 
Yes, the intuition suggests (at stages 4-5). The same for sofa and contract. 
We can see his initial proposal as a variation of the crucial example, 
replacing water with items like sofa, arthritis or contract. This changes 
the TE already in its initial stages. Now, intuitive induction, our stage 6: 
the contents of the thought of ignorant persons all depend on the public 
meaning of the terms involved. The very content of thought is determined 
externally; a strong externalism about content, not just about linguistic 
meaning, follows. Of course, a lot of work is to be done at the next stages 
to relate the view to other accepted ideas in philosophy of mind. Burge 
and his followers will be adamant about the externalist intuition, its  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externalist explanation, and the general externalist stance; all else can be 
changed, but not these results. Some kind of reflective equilibrium 
follows (of course, it can be challenged by the internalist, who might 
point out that on this account we don’t know contents of our thoughts, as 
Boghossian famously did-see References). 
Incredibly enough, the trail generated by the externalist proposal will be 
crossing another trail, the Demon TE that comes from a Cartesian 
tradition, and the fans of the trail will try to subvert the results from the 
Cartesian one. Consider a brain-in-a-vat: does it have false thoughts 
about the external world, a Cartesian thinker will ask. Well, does it have 
thoughts about the external world at all? The externalist line suggests a 
negative answer. But, if it has no thoughts about the external world, it 
does not have any false thoughts about the external world; skepticism is 
inconsistent. No wonder, there is a recent book bringing together the 
papers from the crossing, Sanford C. Goldberg’s 2016 collection The 
Brain in a Vat. A discussion of this crossing of the two traditions would 
demand a separate paper. However, mere pointing out the phenomenon of 
crossing is all we can do here. 
To conclude, the history of semantic externalism can be reconstructed to 
a large extent as history of the Twin Earth TE(s) debate. Attention to the 
internal structure of the TE(s), especially to the sore-fruitful spots at each 
stage of the TE that prompt questioning and the debate make see the 
discussion and the ‘spate of articles’ produced as rational response to the 
crucial issue involved. The elementary reconstruction of the TE(s) in 
terms of stages, and of problems connected with the performance of the 
experiment combine with diachronic rational reconstruction of the history 
of externalism as a whole and make us understand the important trail of 
contemporary analytic semantics and theory of mental content in rational 
and philosophically relevant terms. 
Let me now pass to the opposite, internalist trail, extremely popular, with 
a lot of followers. First, a moderate proposal. Searle insisted that the 
difference between contents is internal, due to the nature of intentionality, 
and reflexive functioning of the indexical(s) allegedly involved (“this 
metal”) (Searle 1983, 206). Next, consider a more radical proposal, 
involving a deeper analysis of earthling vs. Twin earthling thoughts. 
There is a kind of mental content, narrow content, that is the same across 
Earth-Twin Earth contrast. Just consider causal powers of the thoughts: 
„being a water thinker is the same causal power as being a twater thinker, 
only instantiated in a person with a different causal history.” (Fodor 1991, 
5-26, reprinted in Pessin and Goldberg (eds.) 1996, 275 ff). His further 
conclusion is that the narrow content is the right content for psychology 
(and psychological generalizations), the view known as methodological 
solipsism The final reflective equilibrium reached is completely opposite 
from Burge’s and later Putnam’s, and it has had a lot of followers.  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So, we may look at the longer term history of different stages within the 
history of a TE or its variants. It starts with initial experiment, including 
variation, general belief-conclusion, explanation, and early reflective 
equilibrium, and can for example proceed to a new question. Is the 
linguistic meaning determined by external factors is supplemented with a 
more dramatic question: isn’t the mental state itself then determined by 
external factors? There will be a new example (arthritis in the thigh), or a 
new reading of the old one (or one can accept two kinds of content, like 
Fodor, and Jackson). The new process of ‘intuitive induction’ will lead to 
a new conclusion, say that one extended to mental content that now 
varies with the surrounding. Then we need a new explanation: causal 
theory is widened to the mental content, and the division of linguistic 
labor has internal psychological consequences. This is a new reflective 
equilibrium, different from the earlier one(s). With some luck a new trail 
is created, which can become a real new tradition. And this can be 
repeated many times, passing, for instance to analysis of ethical 
discourse, and proposing Moral Twin Earth TE (see T. Horgan and M. 
Timmons 1992). But, there is space for other kinds of variation, for 
instance, including information about scientific treatment of kinds 
(chemistry, biology, etc.), what Unger would describe as Substantial 
Scientiphicalism. Or, one can proceed to psychological questioning as has 
been done in experimental philosophy (see Haukioja 2015 for some 
discussion of Putnam). 
What is crucial of us is the link between short-term and long-term pattern 
of (thought-) experimental reasoning. This has not been noticed in the 
literature. Let me summarize what has been said in this section in the 
following table: 
!
STAGES VARIATION AND NEW 
TRAILS
EXAMPLES
Stage 0 - design Accommodating data from 
stages 6, 7, 8
Redesigning the TE 
Tyler Burge: externalist 
proposal 
Jackson: varying which 
world is actual 
Fodor: methodological 
solipsism





From language to the 
mind 
or 
From mind to ethics: 
moral Twin Earth
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Stage 2 - understanding (adding explanatory  
material)
Stage 3 - tentative  
conscious production: 
tries to imagine the  
arrangement and does it to 
one’s satisfaction. 
Stage 4 - possible non-
conscious elaboration 
Stage 5 - Intuition:  
immediate spontaneous  
answer 
Questioning intuition, 
suggesting a different 
judgment
Jackson: 
a very different intuition 
XYZ is water in one sense, 
is not water in another !
Fodor: 
We and Twin Earthlings 
share one content (narrow), 
but not the other (wide)
Stage 6 - Intuitive  
induction: varying and  
generalizing
Conservative:  
Widening the range 
Revolutionary: 
P r o b l e m a t i z i n g t h e 
original examples 
????
Jackson and Fodor both 
w i d e n t h e r a n g e 
enormously, so as to cover 
all Putnam’s cases (and 
perhaps more)
Stage 7 - general belief !!!!
7a explanation









2 kinds of content 
methodological solipsism
Stage 8 - search for  
reflective equilibrium
Traditionalist:  
revise G and keep the 
inherited beliefs 
revolutionary:  
keep G and change the 
inherited beliefs
Stage 8a - reflective  
equilibrium achieved





But why do philosophers go through all these efforts. One answer is that 
TEs are indispensable. Philosophy does not use laboratory to test its 
theories; the only experiments available here are those in thought. TEs 
play in philosophy the crucial role that laboratory experiments play in 
science. Philosophers are vitally interested in connections between our 
spontaneous understanding of important items, like meaning and content 
of our thoughts, and the results of science. In order to answer the question 
about the relation between, say, cognitive science-cum-neurology and our 
feeling of having contentful thought, we need to confront the two, and we 
cannot do it within science alone. We need the bridge, and a TE is a 
perfect candidate. TEs are our laboratory, and philosophers return to their 
experiments, as scientists do to theirs. 
We now understand why one should go historical in the meta-philosophy 
of TEs, rather than stay exclusively with the usual style of topical 
discussion. The spates of articles, lamented by Unger, are trails, 
promising to become traditions, and mark the present-day analytic 
philosophy, as their ancestors marked the early twentieth century efforts. !
5. Trails-traditions: towards a meta-philosophy of analytic efforts !
It is time to generalize, and draw the morals from our discussion of 
Putnam’s TEs. We obviously need a historically informed meta-
philosophy of analytic efforts, in this case ones connected to thought-
experimenting, and combining the awareness of the inner structure of a 
TE with insights into historical, diachronic process of generation of trails 
leading from various components of a TE to further and further 
developments. Some famous examples, much older than the analytic 
tradition, like Plato’s TE of ideal state, and Descartes’s Evil Demon TE 
present the same trail-forming tendency. 
Here are the elements we were able to identify. First, the indispensability 
of thought-experimenting. There is often no other way to address central 
philosophical questions. So, there is no wonder that challenges TEs are 
revisited time and again 
Second, performing a TE involves asking a question and then letting the 
subject decide; like in laboratory TEs, the designer of the experiment is 
not the absolute master. There are performance challenges, issuing in hot 
spots: the reader responds differently from the expectations of the 
designer. So, the designer has to go back to the drawing board, and vary 
the initial proposed scenario. Or, a colleague with different background 
opinions might find the intended answer incredible. Then she has to 
propose an alternative scenario that will vindicate her intuitions. This 
produces endless variation in scenarios and questions and production of 
new intuitions and immediate generalizations.  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Next, the history sets in, with long term development of these 
generalizations, attempts to explain them, and new candidates for 
reflective equilibrium, from very conservative to very radical ones. Trails 
are being born, that, if there is luck enough, turn into solid tradition. 
Note that laboratory experiments are discussed and varied in the same 
way as TEs. Take Edison’s discovery that direct current can do marvelous 
things. But then comes Tesla: “Yes, boss, but alternating current can do 
many more, and much more marvelous ones.” What followed was "War 
of Currents" in the 1880s over whose electrical system would power the 
world — Tesla's alternating-current (AC) system or Edison's rival direct-
current (DC) electric power. 
So with laboratory experiments we have the same pattern: first, the initial 
experiment, followed by small, routine variations, then, in case of really 
important ones, a spectacular variation. Scientists discuss the prospects of 
both, and propose further variations, if needed. Remember the quote from 
F. James who stresses the variability of experiments, and compare his 
diagnosis to what happened with Twin Earth TE. 
Back to the diachronic developments in a long-term life of a TE. Let me 
make a first step towards generalizing the morals of it and offer a new 
proposal for the understanding of the history of debates around important 
TEs that make up a significant part of analytic philosophy. Let me again 
mention two to three famous TEs: Evil demon-Brain in a vat TE and the 
Social contract. These have engendered long term traditions, each lasting 
around three hundred years, if we count modern philosophy only, and set 
aside the Greeks and Saint Augustine. If we could bring together short-
term and long-term stages, this would make the historical process more 
intelligible. For instance, take the relatively recent variations of the two 
mentioned thought-experimental oldies. The Evil Demon has been 
innovatively transformed into (or replaced with) the Brain-in-a vat (see 
Goldberg,2016), and Social contract has generated the Original position 
proposal (see Hinton, 2015) and its relatives, due to Scanlon and 
Habermas. 
The patterns seems recognizable. The tradition starts with an initial TE, 
and proceeds through three possible kinds of reactions. First, a new 
variant of the TE or a new, but related TE is proposed. In the Social 
Contract tradition, one can change the characterization of the parties 
involved (males only, females as well, what about mentally challenged 
persons, and so on). The dramatic example of the latter is Brain-in-a-vat: 
replace the thinking person from the original Cartesian scenario with a 
brain wired to a control panel. 
Or, there can be a non-thought experimental reaction to the initial TE: 
think of the numerous objections to Descartes First Meditation, collected 
in Meditations with Objections and replies, or of the “negative program” 
within experimental philosophy, or, concerning Original position and its  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consequences, the criticisms of B. Barry (1973). 
Finally, we can have both, criticisms plus new TE, the way we just saw in 
Unger’s reaction to Putnam. Once we have the big picture, we understand 
the strange reaction from Unger: on the one hand criticizing the spate of 
papers discussing Twin Earth TE as empty, meaningless, and over-
complicated, and on the other, adding to the spate, by proposing further, 
related, but much more complicated TEs. On the one hand, a philosopher 
is tempted to a negative reaction when one notices the sheer length of a 
famous TE trail. On the other, the only legitimate way to criticize is to 
add to the trail! 
The history is in some respect analogous to short term reflection and 
discussion of such a TE, say in a seminar or a conference. Stages of 
understanding and debating normally structure the short term life of the 
TE. Longer lasting attempts (with variations, often fundamental) are part 
of the further, historical story. So, we can integrate the view of history of 
(analytic) philosophy with meta-philosophy of TEs, and then, we shall 
find Unger-like disappointments and criticisms less persuasive, and less 
worrisome. Twin water has become part of the philosophical ecology, and 
has a right to stay with us. It is part of our life as philosophers. In the case 
of science, understanding the history of science, we need the 
understanding of the longer history, of the laboratory experimental 
tradition tied to some important initial experiment. The same holds for 
TEs in philosophy and science: we need the understanding of the longer 
history of each given TE in the history of philosophy We want to know 
what is the relation between such historical changes, and the usual micro-
variations of a given TE. Once we have a worked out the answer we shall 
be able to integrate the meta-philosophy of TEs with information from 
history of philosophy. Here, we have the first steps. And Putnam’s work 
remains as the paradigmatic example of depth and fruitfulness of thought-
experimenting in philosophy. The Star Wars continue. !!!
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